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REFORMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE  
ONE STATE AT A TIME 
Thomas W. Hiltachk* † 
Introduction 
The genius of our United States Constitution is the delicate balance our 
Founding Fathers struck between empowering a national government and 
preserving the inherent sovereignty of individual states. Any proposed gov-
ernmental reform that would interfere with that balance should be looked 
upon skeptically. Recent proposals to do away with the Electoral College in 
favor of a national popular vote for President deserve such careful examina-
tion. But that does not mean that reform is out of reach. We have only to 
look to the Constitution itself to find that the answer lies in the self-interest 
of each state.  
I am an attorney specializing in election law in California. I recently au-
thored a proposed statewide initiative that would change California’s 
winner-take-all system of awarding its fifty-five electoral votes to a system 
currently employed by the states of Maine and Nebraska. In each of these 
two states, the presidential candidate winning the popular vote in each of the 
state’s congressional districts is awarded one electoral vote while the winner 
of the state’s overall popular vote is awarded two electoral votes. Pundits 
and partisans immediately questioned my motivation in offering such a pro-
posal, suggesting that I was trying to rig the election—you see, I am a 
Republican living in a predominantly Democratic state. The truth, however, 
is that I am a Californian first and foremost.  
I. The Need for Reform in California 
One would think that with fifty-five electoral votes (nearly twenty percent 
of the total needed to win election) presidential candidates would be falling all 
over themselves trying to woo California voters. That is not the case. In fact, 
no presidential candidate has seriously campaigned in California in decades. 
Interestingly, California has historically been either a reliably “red” or “blue” 
state for extended periods of time. (It chose the Republican nominee from 
1968–1988 and the Democratic nominee from 1992–2004, though concededly 
the Republican nominees were favorite sons Nixon and Reagan and near-
favorite son Ford.) Yet our state is also extremely diverse—ethnically, 
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geographically, and politically. We have had a Democratic-controlled legis-
lature for decades, and yet three of our last four governors have been 
Republicans. Populations on our coastline are generally liberal, while the 
state’s great central valley and desert regions are mostly conservative. Yet 
both political parties recently have been losing ground in voter registration 
to those choosing to “decline to state” any party affiliation.  
Moreover, California is simply too large in population and geography to 
compare to any other state. With fifty-five electoral votes, California has 
twenty-one more than its nearest rival, Texas. Indeed, this twenty-one elec-
toral vote difference is equivalent to the electoral vote total of other “big” 
states such as Illinois and Pennsylvania. California’s individual congres-
sional districts have about 640,000 residents, more than reside in each of 
three different states and the District of Columbia (each with three electoral 
votes). Meanwhile, California has six congressional districts covering a 
geographic area in excess of 10,000 square miles, bigger than nine states 
and the District of Columbia.  
In the last presidential election, President Bush received over 5.5 million 
votes in California, but no electoral votes, since his opponent John Kerry 
received a majority of the statewide votes that year. Similarly, Democrat 
nominee Bill Clinton received all of California’s electoral votes in 1992 
even though he won only a plurality of the popular vote in California (and in 
the nation). It is no wonder that voter turnout in California has declined 
steadily in successive presidential elections.  
There are consequences to candidates taking California for granted, no 
matter who wins the White House. For example, according to the nonparti-
san California Institute for Federal Policy Research, for over two decades 
Californians annually have sent billions more in federal taxes to Washington 
than they received back in federal grants, payments, and other program ser-
vices. In 2003, California’s federal tax payment deficit was a staggering $50 
billion, nearly $1,400 for every man, woman, and child in California. In 
sum, California receives a return of only about seventy-nine cents on every 
dollar it sends to Washington.  
I have watched with amusement as our legislature has continuously 
moved the date of our presidential primary in an attempt to chase the candi-
dates—first from June in a presidential election year to late March, then to 
early March, and now to early February—all to no avail. In fact, both politi-
cal parties in California have now changed the manner in which they award 
convention delegates in the primary from a winner-take-all system to an 
allocation based on congressional districts. Indeed, the Democratic Party has 
had this district-based system since the 1970s.  
There is no doubt that our winner-take-all system does not inure to the 
benefit of all Californians. Large segments of our society and large parts of 
our state are simply irrelevant to the presidential campaigns—that is, the 
votes of these citizens do not count. If one accepts this premise, then the 
question becomes what California can do to better reflect its voters and to 
become relevant in presidential politics.  
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II. Winner-Take-All
I have no particular quarrel with a system of awarding all of a state’s 
electoral votes to the winner of the state’s popular vote if that method best 
serves the interests of that state. Indeed, I firmly believe that each state 
should be free to choose any reasonable manner of awarding its electoral 
votes. Our national democracy is benefited by empowering its fifty state 
“laboratories of democracy.” Winner-take-all is a valid method that serves 
the interests of many states, particularly smaller states or those where the 
voting population is more homogeneous. But such a system is no longer 
appropriate for California.  
III. Reform Proposals
Over the last few years, two reform proposals have been discussed in 
California. In 2006, our Democratic-controlled legislature passed a bill that 
would make California a signatory to an Electoral College compact (AB 
2948). The compact, entered into by each state, would require each state to 
award its electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote. Under 
the California legislation, the requirement that California award its electoral 
votes to the winner of the national popular vote would not become effective 
until states possessing at least 270 electoral votes (the majority needed to 
win election) have also adopted the compact. Currently, only the states of 
Maryland and New Jersey have entered into the compact. Governor Schwar-
zenegger, a Republican, vetoed the California bill. 
The other reform proposal is the one that I authored as an initiative last 
summer. The idea of awarding electoral votes by congressional district in 
California is not new. Legislation had been introduced more than once in the 
past, but it received little attention. Since the past bills were always pro-
posed by a Republican, they quickly died in the legislature. My proposal, in 
contrast, takes the issue directly to the voters via the state’s initiative proc-
ess.  
A. The Electoral Compact 
The electoral compact is nothing more than an end run around amending 
the United States Constitution. Supporters of the compact simply prefer a 
national popular vote for President. Their problems are that our Constitution 
provides otherwise and that there is a perception (probably valid) that a con-
stitutional amendment would not gain the necessary assent of three-fourths 
of the states. Indeed, it is ironic that the electoral compact proposal relies on 
an assertion of state’s rights to enter into a compact with other states to 
achieve the goal of relinquishing each state’s independent role in the selec-
tion of the President and Vice President as provided by our Founding 
Fathers.  
Even supporters of a national popular vote have reason to oppose the 
electoral compact proposal. Setting aside the serious constitutional issues 
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presented by the current compact proposal, the compact would establish a 
dangerous precedent by allowing a small number of states to dictate the 
electoral outcome. If the compact is legal, why would states be limited to 
awarding electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote? Could 
they also agree to award their electoral votes to the loser of the national 
popular vote? Or to the winner of the popular vote in just the compacting 
states? Or why not to a specific candidate preferred by the compacting states 
without regard to election results? For example, the eleven largest states by 
population could agree to award their 271 electoral votes to any candidate, 
thereby eliminating the overwhelming preference of voters in the other 
thirty-nine states. This is not reform. 
The basic argument against a national popular vote also explains why a 
constitutional amendment proposing a national popular vote is likely to fail. 
The Electoral College was designed to protect the interests of the smaller 
states when electing a president. Indeed, it was one of the least-debated and 
least-controversial provisions of the Constitution. Federalist No. 68 starts by 
noting that “[t]he mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the 
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, 
which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slight-
est mark of approbation from its opponents.”  
As Federalist No. 68 emphasizes, the Electoral College was designed 
specifically to ensure that a candidate for President would appeal to and 
have the confidence of the “whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of 
it” that it would make for a successful presidency. A national popular vote 
can not guarantee that result. The Electoral College, “be [it] not perfect, it is 
at least excellent.”  
B. The Maine-Nebraska Model 
For California, allocating electoral votes in the same manner as Maine 
and Nebraska would cause elections to better reflect voters’ preferences in 
our large and diverse state. Some have argued that our congressional dis-
tricts are mostly noncompetitive (the result of gerrymandering) and that, as 
a consequence, the desired effect of making candidates compete for Califor-
nia’s votes would not occur. Clearly, some regions of our state could be 
reliably counted in one column or the other, but large, undecided parts—
including California’s breadbasket (the Central Valley), San Diego, and the 
Inland Empire—would yield a prevailing candidate several electoral votes. 
Moreover, changing the Electoral College system might also prevent a fu-
ture gerrymander in the next decade and increase the competitiveness of 
districts.  
Opponents of this reform proposal also argue that it would not be fair 
unless the other large states (Texas, New York, Florida, etc.) adopted the 
methodology. Fair to whom? Our Constitution specifically empowers states 
to make their own choices in this regard. States should act in their own self-
interest. Is it fair to Californians that they are all but ignored in the selection 
of our nation’s leader? 
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Lastly, opponents have suggested that changing California’s system of 
awarding its fifty-five electoral votes will sway the election to the Republi-
can Party nominee; they essentially argue that a Democratic Party nominee 
(no matter who it is) will not be able to win the presidency without a fifty-
five electoral vote lock. There is no history to support this theory; in fact, if 
California would have awarded its electoral votes under this proposal in any 
of the presidential elections over the last 100 years, not one election result 
would have changed. What would have changed is that many Californians 
would have had a meaningful role in the presidential election and, presuma-
bly, the issues important to Californians would also have been important to 
the candidates seeking that office.  
Conclusion 
If our country desires to do away with the Electoral College, it should do 
so in the manner contemplated by our Constitution: the deliberate amend-
ment process. The so-called electoral compact should be rejected as an end 
run around the Constitution. That does not mean, however, that each state 
should not consider and re-consider the manner in which it allocates its elec-
toral votes in a way that best reflects the election preferences of its citizens. 
By doing so, reform is found within the basic structure of our Constitution 
as the framers intended.    
